This study contributes to the sparse literature on employment spillovers of minimum wages. We exploit the minimum wage introduction and subsequent increases in the German roofing sector that gave rise to an internationally unprecedented hard bite of a minimum wage. We look at the chances of remaining employed in the roofing sector for workers with and without a binding minimum wage and use the plumbing sector that is not subject to a minimum wage as a suitable benchmark sector. By estimating the counterfactual wage that plumbers would receive in the roofing sector given their characteristics, we are able to identify employment effects along the entire wage distribution. The results indicate that the chances for roofers to remain employed in the sector in eastern Germany deteriorated along the entire wage distribution. Such employment spillovers to workers without a binding minimum wage may result from scale effects and/or capital-labour substitution.
INTRODUCTION
Most minimum wage (in short MW) research focusses on the average employment effect that minimum wages exert on workers with a binding MW, that is, workers whose wage has to be raised in order to comply with the MW level. In a competitive labour market with a heterogenous workforce and an elastic product demand, for example, workers for whom the MW raises labour costs are expected to experience negative employment outcomes (Brown, 1999) . 1 However, depending on the production technology, the MW may also affect workers for whom the MW is not binding (see e.g. Neumark and Wascher, 2008) . If workers with and without a binding MW are complements, a negative scale effect that results from a reduced product demand negatively affects all workers' employment chances. If the two types of workers are substitutes, the MW may raise the demand for workers who earn a wage above the MW, thereby counteracting the negative scale effect by a positive substitution effect. In this case, we may observe negative employment effects for workers with a binding MW and even positive employment effects for workers with a non-binding MW. Moreover, profit-maximising firms may potentially substitute capital for the relatively more expensive labour input, thereby inducing an additional employment decline for all workers who are substitutable by capital. In this latter case, a firm might, in fact, lay off the poorest performers of each type of worker and reduce employment also among workers with a non-binding MW.
The existing literature mainly discusses employment spillovers, that is, indirect employment effects for workers for whom the MW is not binding, as a potential source of bias. Linneman (1982) , Currie and Fallick (1996) , Abowd et al. (2000) and Neumark and Wascher (2000) , for example, identify the average employment effect on workers with a binding MW by comparing workers with and without a binding MW. Attempts to estimate substitution effects between workers tend to focus on the elasticity of substitution between skill or age groups rather than between workers with and without a binding MW. 2 The only study that we are aware of that focuses on employment effects along the wage distribution is by Neumark et al. (2004) . They report evidence for a negative employment spillover for workers with a wage just above the MW level.
The aim of this study was to contribute to the sparse literature on employment spillovers by investigating employment effects along the entire wage distribution. In particular, our contribution is fourfold. First of all, we are able to analyse employment effects in a context where the MW bites very hard: the roofing sector in Germany. Its MW was introduced in 1997 and was subsequently raised several times. With a Kaitz Index, that is, the ratio of the MW level and the median wage, that is around 1 in eastern Germany, the bite has to be considered exceptional even by international standards Machin et al., 2003) . The German roofing sector, thus, is an ideal setting to study employment effects along the entire wage distribution since its bite is likely to render indirect employment effects for workers above the MW. Our contribution, thus, extends the sparse literature on employment effects of minimum wages in the German construction sector for which K€ onig and M€ oller (2009) report negative evidence for eastern Germany and positive but not always significant effects in western Germany whereas Frings (2012) does not find significantly negative employment effects neither for western nor for eastern Germany.
Secondly, we are able to exploit a natural experiment since, for institutional reasons, the MW was introduced only in parts of the construction sector including the roofing sector. Uncovered, yet comparable, sub-sectors may, thus, serve as a benchmark for the counterfactual development in the roofing sector in order to derive the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) with respect to the chances of remaining employed in the roofing sector. Since the entire construc-tion sector experienced a dramatic decline in demand after the end of the unification boom in the mid 1990s that almost halved the workforce in eastern Germany, this is a highly relevant employment outcome.
Thirdly, we contrast the ATT from an intersectoral comparison with an ATT derived from a comparison of workers with and without a binding MW within the roofing sector. Under a number of identifying assumptions, a deviation between these ATTs may hint at employment spillovers within the roofing sector. In order to make such spillovers visible, we then combine both identification strategies. For this purpose, we estimate the counterfactual wage that workers of the control sector would receive in the roofing sector given their characteristics. This enables a comparison of workers with and without a binding MW across sectors and also allows for estimating the employment effects along the entire wage distribution.
Finally, we make use of two administrative linked employer-employee panels one of which contains the full sample of workers in the roofing sector over the observation period of interest. This allows for approximating the hourly wage information in a much more precise way than in other studies dealing with the German construction sector such as K€ onig and M€ oller (2009) and Frings (2012) . 3 Moreover, we are able to take account of unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level, which may be relevant if employers mainly substitute workers along unobservable skills as is suggested by Fairris and Bujanda (2008) . Our study, thus, yields much broader insights into the employment effects of minimum wages than most previous studies.
The findings indicate that the chances to remain employed in the roofing sector have deteriorated due to the MW introduction, especially in eastern Germany where the bite of the MW was particularly hard. However, the impact suggested by comparing workers with and without a binding MW appears to be underestimated compared to the intersectoral comparison, thus hinting at employment spillovers of the MW on workers without a binding MW. An intersectoral comparison suggests negative employment outcomes for eastern German workers along the entire wage distribution. According to personal interviews with sector insiders, capital-labour substitution rather than scale effects drive this finding. Our results highlight the need for a broader perspective on the employment impact of minimum wages and also put doubts on any attempt to identify employment effects of minimum wages by comparing workers with and without a binding MW within a covered sector.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 contains information on the German roofing sector, the introduction of the MW and discusses some expectations for the empirical estimations given its market structure. Section 3 describes the data basis before Section 4 discusses the bite of the MW. The results on the average employment effects and the employment effects along the wage distribution are described in Section 5. Section 6 includes some robustness checks of the results before Section 7 concludes.
THE GERMAN ROOFING SECTOR

Market structure
The goods and services that are provided by the roofing sector encompass the roofing of new buildings as well as the mending of old roofs. Roofing is a traditional craft in Germany requiring a master craftsman's diploma in order to start a business. 4 These traditional roofing companies usually employ less than ten employees and provide their services regionally and mainly to private home owners whose demand may be rather inelastic given the few available and mainly illegal substitutes such as moonlighting. In a survey among 250 roofing companies in 2011, more than three quarters of all companies considered quality rather than prices to be the main dimension of competition (Aretz et al., 2011) . For those companies with more than 30 employees, which constitute less than 10% of all roofing companies, however, price competition may be more relevant since they tend to work for public contractors and are active beyond regional boundaries. 5 Moreover, in contrast to most sectors that have been studied extensively in the MW literature, the roofing sector has a rather high level of qualification and is not very labour intensive. More than 95% of all workers work fulltime, and a relatively high share of around three quarters has at least a vocational training degree. 6 Moreover, labour costs account for less than 40% of total costs only (Kostenstruktur der Unternehmen im Baugewerbe, 2001), and technical advances regarding materials and roofing techniques appear to be quite important as reported by roofing companies in a number of qualitative interviews. 7
Business cycle
The entire construction sector experienced a boom period in the early 1990s due to German reunification but began to shrink from the mid 1990s on, see Figure  1 . In eastern Germany, this post-unification downturn was much more dramatic than in western Germany and reduced the construction sector's revenues in the subsequent years by more than half. After 2004, all construction sectors reinstalled revenue levels in western Germany similar to the early 1990s, while the recovery in eastern Germany was rather marginal. Compared with structural engineering, the roofing sector and other sub-construction sectors such as plumbing, glazing and painting services experienced a less dramatic decline in the demand for their services in the mid-1990s and a faster recovery after 2004. The demand for sub-construction work hinges on the demand for new buildings 4. As an exception, it is not required to hold such a diploma if someone works as an itinerant worker. Such workers tend to work alone and mainly provide mending services only. 5. Information on company size is based on the BA data (see Section 3 for details). 6. The part-time information is taken from the Cost Structure Survey for 2001 (Kostenstrukturerhebung), which is released by the German Statistical Office. The share of qualified workers is calculated based on the BA data (see Section 3 for details). 7. Ten qualitative interviews with roofing companies and four additional interviews with representatives of the trade union and the employer's association were conducted within a report prepared for the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, see Aretz et al. (2011) for details.
as well as the age structure of the existing stock of houses with the latter apparently having a smoothing impact on the business cycle compared to structural engineering. Moreover, sub-construction sectors broadened their portfolio during the last years, thereby stabilising the demand for their services. In particular, roofing companies are increasingly involved in the assembling of photovoltaic cells as well as the ex post insulation of old roofs. 8 The plumbers and, to a lesser extent, glaziers and painters also benefited from this development. At least in western Germany, this has presumably contributed to a faster recovery in the roofing and the plumbing sector compared to the other sub-construction sectors and structural engineering.
Minimum wage regulations
Apart from shrinking demand, additional pressures in the mid-1990s stemmed from the introduction of a free movement of labour that allowed Eastern European firms to send workers to German construction sites while paying home country wages. In order to protect German workers, legally binding minimum wages that had to be paid to all workers on German construction sites irrespective of the origin of their contract were introduced in the structural engineering and some sub-construction sectors. Since minimum wages are negotiated separately for certain sub-divisions of the construction sector, not all sub-divisions agreed on MW regulations, resulting in a coexistence of quite comparable sectors with a legally binding MW (e.g. structural engineering and roofing sector since 1997; painting sector since 2003) and sectors such as glazing and plumbing services that are not subject to a legally binding MW until now. Hence, these sectors may potentially serve as a benchmark for the counterfactual development in the roofing sector in the absence of a legally binding MW.
The MW in the roofing sector applies to all blue-collar workers of any roofing company or roofing branch within a larger company who are at least 18 years of age, who are not an apprentice and who are not working as a custodial worker. Thus, all white-collar workers such as office clerks as well as certain parts of the blue-collar workforce are exempted from the MW regulation. Introduced in October 1997, the MW was subsequently raised several times but was also interrupted by short periods without any legally binding minimum wages (see Figure 2 ). These interruptions reflect the fact that the MW is negotiated between the responsible trade union (IG Bau) and the association of employers in the roofing sector (Zentralverband des Deutschen Dachdeckerhandwerks) as a part of the general collective bargaining agreement. When these agreements expire, there may be short interruptions before a new agreement is reached. Because the continuation of a MW was not subject to any debate since its introduction, roofing companies could, however, expect a new MW agreement, rendering any behavioural adjustments during these interruptions very unlikely. Moreover, minimum wages were harmonised between western and eastern Germany in 2003 despite wages in western Germany exceeding wages in eastern Germany by about 25%. This results in an extremely hard bite of the MW in eastern Germany as we will see in Section 4. Taking all this evidence together, the roofing sector's market structure suggests a rather limited impact of minimum wages on employment given its limited labour intensity, the ability of roofing companies to at least absorb some of the additional costs by raising prices and the fact that technical advances and increases in productivity offer options for cushioning rising labour costs. At the same time, however, the lower wage floor was fixed on a rather high level (see also Section 4), particularly in eastern Germany, thus rendering employment effects likely. Moreover, changes in relative input prices may create incentives for substituting labour by capital and/or less skilled by skilled workers. Finally, the MW in the roofing sector was introduced during a period of economic downturn and a shrinking market size. This strongly reduced the sector's workforce (see Appendix A), although the number of companies even slightly increased at the same time as the share of single-person companies jumped from 8% in 1995 to 23% in 2010. With the number of unemployed workers with sector-specific human capital queuing for jobs on a rise, the bargaining power of those still working in the sector may have come under pressure. 
ADMINISTRATIVE LINKED EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE DATA
For our analysis, we are able to exploit two administrative linked employeremployee panel data sets: (1) data that are collected by the central pay office of the roofing sector (Lohnausgleichskasse, LAK), in short the LAK data, and (2) data that are collected by the Federal Labour Agency (Bundesagentur f€ ur Arbeit, BA) for all employees who are subject to social insurance contributions, in short the BA data.
LAK Data
In order to balance out the seasonal fluctuation of the sector, all roofing companies have to pay an insurance premium to the LAK that is related to the total payroll of their blue-collar workers. Therefore, they are obliged to give a monthly record to the central pay office of the roofing sector. For our analysis, we have access to the full sample of blue-collar workers on a monthly basis for the years 1995-2010, thus covering both the pre-and post-MW period. Information on monthly working hours and monthly gross wages allows for calculating the hourly gross wage. Between October and April, however, reported working hours need not match the true working hours because of special regulations for cushioning the seasonal character of the sector's activities. Hence, we use the June information for the analysis based on the LAK data in order to avoid such distortions and to ensure the comparability of the analysis with the BA data (see below).
The LAK data contains additional information only on sex and age of the workers. Since we do not know whether someone is an apprentice or working as a custodial worker, who are both exempted from the MW regulation, we are not able to exactly identify all covered workers. Since most custodial workers are female, however, and the share of females among covered roofers is less than 2% according to the BA data, we exclude women from the LAK sample. We also exclude all workers below the age of 19 and assume that this also eliminates most uncovered apprentices. Our sample, thus, differs from the exact coverage by missing some covered women and including some uncovered apprentices in the sample. Overall, we observe a total of 1,094,609 observations between 1995 and 2010 that stem from 217,779 individuals in 22,879 firms. Note that we are able to calculate some firm level information such as average gross pay, average firm size and average age of the company's workforce that we can use in addition to the individual information.
BA Data
A major disadvantage of the LAK data is that it is only available for the roofing sector, thus precluding any identification strategy that rests upon intersectoral comparisons. Such an alternative identification strategy, however, becomes available based on the BA data since it includes information for 75% of all companies in the roofing sector as well as sub-samples of companies in other sub-construction sectors such as painting, plumbing and glazing services for the observation period from 1994 to 2008. 9 For all individuals who are subject to social insurance contributions and work in one of these companies on 30 June, the data contain the corresponding period of continued employment in that company within the calender year that overlaps 30 June. 10 Thus, the longest spell encompasses the full calender year, while the shortest employment spell would be an employment period of one day on 30 June only.
For each employment spell, we have information on age, sex, educational background, the gross daily wage, occupation and occupational status. Thus, the data allow for identifying covered individuals quite precisely. In particular, we are able to exclude custodial workers, apprentices and white-collar workers as well as underage workers. 11 Overall, the sample consists of 791,910 observations in the roofing sector that stem from 172,257 covered roofers in 17,186 roofing firms and 1,557,661 observations by 354,834 workers in 35,250 firms from other sub-construction sectors who fulfill the same criteria.
Since the data only distinguishes between full-time and part-time workers and includes information on daily gross wages only, the main restriction of the BA data refers to the corresponding lack of information on hourly gross wages. As a remedy, we impute the hourly gross wage by estimating the observed hourly gross wage in the LAK data as a function of explanatory variables that are available in both datasets. For this purpose, we first adjust the LAK data to have a similar data structure as the BA data by creating employment spells for each individual who has worked on 30 June. For these spells, both datasets provide information on or allow for computing the length of the spell, the beginning of the spell, the daily gross wage, dummies for part-time or full-time employment, individual information on sex and age as well as a number of firm-level information such as firm size, workforce composition, and average gross daily wage. 12 Using all these explanatory variables and allowing for additional heterogeneity by estimating the wage model separately for each year, eastern and western Germany as well as for workers of different quintiles of the daily gross wage distribution, we are able to explain 88% of the variation in hourly gross wages in the LAK data. We then use these estimates for predicting the hourly wage in the BA data. The quality of this imputation not only hinges on the R 2 of the wage estimation, but also depends on the comparability of the LAK and the BA sample and explanatory variables. Appendix B shows that the imputed and observed wage distribution are very comparable. As a result, the average predicted mean wage for full-time workers of 13.26€ and 9.94€ in the BA data in western and eastern Ger-9. This information is taken from the Betriebshistorikdatei, a dataset that aggregates the individual data that is collected by the BA to the firm level, see Hethey-Maier and Seth (2010) for details on the data. 10. This information is taken from the employee record of the BA (Besch€ aftigtenmeldungen), see for example Drews (2008) for details. 11. We also exclude workers with a minor employment which is defined as earning below the social insurance contribution threshold of 400€ per month because these workers are included in the data only after 1998. For comparability reasons, we also dropped such workers in the LAK data. 12. Although we do not use women in the LAK analyses, we do use their LAK wage and impute the corresponding wage in the BA data to be able to include them in the analyses conducted with the BA data. many, respectively, comes very close to the observed average wage in the LAK data with 13.22€ for western Germany and 9.85€ for eastern Germany. 13 Table 1 displays several indicators of the bite of the MW for the June preceding the introduction of a new MW regulation within the next year. In particular, we look at the share of covered workers for whom the upcoming MW is binding due to earning a wage below the minimum in the June preceding the new MW regulation. 14 We also show the average wage increase these workers would have to 13. Thus, the hourly wage information in the BA data is approximated in a much more precise way than in other studies, for example by K€ onig and M€ oller (2009) and Frings (2012) . 14. We do not adjust for nominal wage changes between the two dates of comparison because the intermediate time span is quite short.
THE MINIMUM WAGE AND ITS BITE
receive in case of full compliance with the upcoming MW. This individual wage gap for a worker i with a binding MW in period t is thereby defined as follows:
where w it represents the workers hourly wage and MW i;tþ1 the upcoming MW. We contrast this wage gap to their actual wage increase within the next year and the actual wage increase during the same time period among workers for whom the MW was not binding. We complement this information by the Kaitz-Index, that is the ratio between the MW level and the median wage in the sector. Note that the indicators may slightly underestimate the bite of the MW due to the fact that the hourly wage may contain overtime compensation that is not subject to the MW. 15 The indicators based on the LAK data allow for several interesting insights. First of all, the share of covered workers for whom the MW was binding by the time of its introduction was as low as 1.3% in western Germany compared to 12.5% in eastern Germany. While this share rose up to 5% in western Germany until 2008, around 50% of all eastern workers earned below the upcoming MW at that time, a share that clearly exceeds the impact level that Machin et al. (2003) considered a hard biting MW. This extreme bite was fostered by the introduction of a common MW level in both parts of the country in 2003. Since then, the MW level approximately corresponds to the median wage in eastern Germany so that the Kaitz-Index ranges around 100%. Even in western Germany, the Kaitz-Index still ranges between two-thirds and three quarters of the median wage. Compared to , who find the Kaitz-Index to range between 30% and 70% in a survey among 22 OECD countries, the bite of the MW in the roofing sector is, thus, extremely hard, especially in eastern Germany.
We also observe that the MW has been effective, that is, actual wage increases among workers with a binding MW exceeded the wage increases among workers for whom the MW was not binding. While the change in the western German wage distribution is rather marginal, the wage compression in eastern Germany results in a huge spike of workers whose wages range around the MW level, see Figure 3 . Finally, note that despite these actual increases, they still fall short of the increases workers would have had to receive in case of full compliance, especially in western Germany during the initial years after the MW introduction. The improved compliance with the MW regulation during the last years might be due to stronger controls after 2006 according to interviews that we conducted with sector insiders.
Table 1 also contrasts the share of workers with a binding MW based in the LAK data to the corresponding share based on the imputation in the BA data. In contrast to the LAK data, however, the share of workers with a binding MW follows a probabilistic concept because we do not only impute the mean wage 15. On average, overtime hours account for 6% of the working hours in June and, thus, may lead to an estimated hourly wage that is up to 1.6% too high depending on the applied overtime compensation scheme ranging from no additional compensation to a markup of 25%. Since we do not know which scheme is applied, we left the data uncorrected as the resulting imprecision appears to be rather marginal.
Employment Effects in the Roofing Sector prediction for each individual but also the corresponding distribution that results from the unexplained variance and the variance of the estimated parameters.
Assuming this distribution to be normally distributed, we are then able to calculate the probability that the wage of a worker falls below the MW level which we denote by P MW . For the BA data, Table 1 , thus, reports the average predicted probability of being affected by a binding MW among all covered workers. As we can see, the resulting share of workers with a binding MW resembles the LAK patterns but differs in levels, especially for eastern Germany in the last years. In fact, imputing the probability of being affected by a binding MW in the LAK data gave very similar deviations to the observed share of workers with a binding MW. Hence, it is apparently the extreme wage compression that leads to the asymmetric form of the wage distribution in Figure 3 and, thus, to a systematic underestimation of the share of workers with a binding MW in eastern Germany, see Appendix C for further explanation.
Despite the large bite of the MW, especially demonstrated by the high wage compression in eastern Germany, the overall labour cost burden is still modest for two reasons. First, even in the case of full compliance with respect to the MW regulations, total labour costs only increased by 1% in western Germany and 2.5% in eastern Germany on average during the observed time period. Second, labour costs amount to less than 40% of total costs, so that the change in average total costs varies across time between 0.2% and 0.5% in western Germany and 0.3% and 0.8% in eastern Germany. However, despite the low impact on total costs on average, some firms may well be affected more strongly. Moreover, the cost burden may cumulate over time due to the gradual increase in the MW level.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that individuals with a binding MW clearly differ between western and eastern Germany. While the average worker with a binding MW in eastern Germany does not differ much from an average worker without a binding MW, the average worker with a binding MW in western Germany rather corresponds to a marginal worker with below average human capital, short tenure and part-time employment in firms with a skill and wage level below average, see Table 2 . 
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS
Since the MW was introduced for the entire sector at the same time, a strategy for the identification of the MW impact on employment cannot rest on regional variation as has been done in many US studies (among others Dube et al., 2007 and Card and Krueger, 1994 , 2000 . Exploiting the existing variation in the MW level between eastern and western Germany in the mid-1990s is also not advisable since the business cycle after the reunification boom differed between both parts of the country (see Figure 1 ). Moreover, recent attempts to evaluate minimum wages using the incremental differences-in-differences framework (see e.g. do not seem able to convincingly isolate the causal effect of each MW increase from lagged or anticipation effects. Thus, there are mainly two potential approaches available for the identification of employment effects. Either one uses a sub-construction sector that is not covered by a MW regulation but is as similar as possible to the roofing sector (intersectoral comparison), or one exploits the variation in treatment intensity within the roofing sector by comparing workers with and without a binding MW (intrasectoral comparison). We will apply both approaches using a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework and concentrate on measuring the chances of remaining employed in the same sector. 16 For this, let e it denote the employment status in period t for an individual i. In particular, let e itþ1 ¼ 1 in case of being employed in the same 16. This outcome measure is of main interest in a market context that is dominated by a shrinking market size and a corresponding reduction in employment since the mid-1990s, compare Appendix A. The question of whether someone was able to keep his job in this market context given the additional cost pressures of the MW is of main concern. On average, 80% (77%) of all western (eastern) German roofers are still employed in the same sector after one year. Note, that this outcome should not be equated with effects on the total employment in the roofing sector.
As an example, additional market entries by single person companies are not captured by this employment outcome.
sector as in the previous period and e itþ1 ¼ 0 otherwise, an outcome measure that we are able to observe in both the LAK and the BA data. As the outcome variable is binary, a logit estimation might be appropriate. However, we believe that it is important to consider individual fixed effects because selection on unobservable characteristics may be relevant. Since fixed effects can not be identified in a logit model framework (Wooldridge, 2002) , we estimate a simple linear probability model (LPM) with fixed effects in the following way:
where a g captures the time constant difference between the control and the treatment group, c p allows for changes in the period after compared to the period before the MW introduction that are common to both groups, m t captures yearspecific effects, c i depicts the individual fixed effects and X corresponds to a set of control variables. 17 D it is the treatment indicator with D it ¼ 1 for individuals of the treatment group after the treatment has taken place, and D it ¼ 0 otherwise. 18 In Section 5.1 we show the results for the intersectoral and intrasectoral approach. If all underlying assumptions were valid, we should yield similar results for both approaches. As we will see and further discuss in Section 6, this is not the case, indicating that spillover effects of the MW on workers earning above the MW level are present. In Section 5.2, we therefore explicitly estimate the employment effects along the wage distribution by running the intersectoral comparison for workers falling in different wage deciles.
Average employment effects
Intersectoral comparison
A feasible control sector needs to capture the counterfactual change in employment outcomes for roofers in the absence of the MW. For this to be a plausible assumption, the control sector should have a comparable market structure as well as comparable demand conditions. Among the sub-construction sectors without a legally binding MW -the plumbing and the glazing sector 19 -the plumbing sector is preferable for a number of reasons. According to Figure 1 , the business cycle in the plumbing rather than the glazing sector resembles the business cycle in the roofing sector. In fact, for western Germany demand conditions almost follow the same path, while in eastern Germany the demand for plumbing services started to drop somewhat earlier than in the roofing sector, a deviation that we will return to in the robustness analysis in Section 6. 17. All estimations for the BA data include individual and firm covariates. On the individual level the occupational status and educational attainment (6 dummies) are used as explanatory variables. On the firm level we use age and qualification of the company workforce, company size (4 dummies), and second order polynomial of the mean daily gross wage. The same covariates except educational attainment are used for the LAK data. 18. We find that in most cases, only few observations have predictions outside the plausible range.
We also estimated the models using pooled Logit and pooled OLS. The pooled results turned out to be quite similar indicating that the LPM model performs well; for more details see Aretz et al. (2012) . 19. The painting sector introduced a MW in 2003. Table 3 , the plumbing sector is similar to the roofing sector with regard to important market indicators that moderate the potential impact of a MW. 20 In particular, roofing and plumbing companies are similarly sized in terms of both the number of employees and the revenues generated. Also, the value added is highest in the roofing sector, closely followed by the plumbing sector. Moreover, the glazing sector is more labour-intensive and invests almost twice as much per employee than the other sectors while the average gross daily wage is quite comparable across all sectors. Finally, the number of companies per one million euro of revenues in the sector, a measure of the degree of competition, is almost identical in the roofing and plumbing sector but much lower in the glazing sector, suggesting less competition. 21 Therefore, we consider the plumbing sector as a suitable and better benchmark for the roofing sector than the glazing sector. For the intersectoral comparison, this means that the treatment group corresponds to all workers of the roofing sector that are covered by the MW regulations, while workers in the plumbing sector, who would have been covered if they worked in the roofing sector, are considered as the control group. In equation (2) D it , thus, equals one for all roofers in the period after the MW introduction (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) and zero otherwise. 20. We display the pre-MW indicators for 1996 wherever it is available as the basis for judging the usefulness of a sector as a benchmark for the roofing sector. 21. Although Table 3 suggests that the roofing and the plumbing sector are very similar, a high comparability is not ensured by all means. The skill level, for example, is higher in the plumbing sector as 18% of the roofers have no vocational education but only 6% of the plumbers.
According to
Employment Effects in the Roofing Sector
Hence, this approach can only be estimated based on the BA data. The treatment refers to being covered by the MW regulations and the resulting estimates give us the ATT in the roofing sector if changes in employment outcomes of plumbers between the exante situation (1994-96) and the expost situation (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) capture the counterfactual change in employment outcomes for roofers in the absence of the MW. Moreover, there may not be any control group contamination, that is, there is no indirect effect of the MW regulations in the roofing sector on the plumbing sector.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 show the ATT for the average treated worker in eastern and western Germany from a pooled LPM and from a LPM that takes account of individual-specific fixed effects (FE LPM) using standard errors clustered at the individual level. 22 Irrespective of the specification, the MW in eastern Germany appears to have reduced the chances for roofers to remain employed in the sector by around 2-3 percentage points on average compared to plumbers who have not been subject to MW regulations. In western Germany, the findings are not as clear. While the pooled LPM suggests a positive MW effect of 1.2 percentage points, the FE LPM indicates that the chances for a roofer to remain employed in the next year after the MW was introduced decreased by 1.2 percentage point compared to plumbers who have not been subject to MW regulations. This suggests that minimum wages in western Germany increased layoffs mainly among workers with poor unobservable characteristics so that pooled estimations are upward biased.
Intrasectoral comparison
Next, we conduct a comparison within the roofing sector. The treatment group in this approach corresponds to roofers with a binding MW due to earning a wage in June that is below the MW level that takes effect until June of the next year. For the pre-regulation years, we consider someone to belong to the treatment group if his wage falls below the MW level that would have to be applied in the pre-regulation years given the increases of the median nominal wage in the LAK data. Workers of the roofing sector whose wages are above that minimum level are used as the control group. While we are able to exactly identify these groups in the LAK data, we define the treatment group in the BA data to encompass all covered workers whose probability to fall below the MW level exceeds 50%. 23 Hence, the treatment indicator D it in equation (2) equals one for all covered workers with a binding MW after the MW introduction and zero otherwise. The estimates give the ATT if changes in employment outcomes for workers without a binding MW between the exante situation (1995-96) 24 and the expost situation (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) capture the counterfactual change in employment outcomes for the treated roofers in the absence of the MW.
This approach can be estimated using both the BA and LAK data. 25 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 show the DiD estimates for the intrasectoral comparison.
The results indicate that workers with a binding MW were 9-10 percentage points less likely to remain employed after the MW introduction relative to workers without a binding MW. This negative effect is confirmed by both the LAK and BA data suggesting that the BA data yield quite reliable estimates despite the imprecision in the distinction between workers with and without a binding MW. For western Germany, the estimates based on the LAK data show an insignificant reduction in the probability of continued employment by À2.7 percentage points, while the treatment effect is slightly larger and significant at the 5% significance level when using the BA data. 26 If all identifying assumptions regarding common trends in the absence of the treatment and the lack of any spillovers held, multiplying the ATT from the intrasectoral comparison by the share of workers with a binding MW should yield the ATT from the previous intersectoral comparison, that is, the average treatment effect (ATE) for all covered workers in the roofing sector. 27 The implied ATEs are included in Table 4 . For eastern Germany, this yields an ATE of À2.0 (=À10.090.204) percentage points for the BA results since, on average, 20.4% of all workers in eastern Germany are affected by a binding MW across the entire period. In western Germany, the MW is binding for 5.5% of the workforce on average, implying an ATE of À0.3% percentage points. Compared to the fixedeffects estimates from the intersectoral comparison in column (2) of Table 4 , the fixed-effects estimates in columns (3) and (4) appear to be underestimated. This deviation can be due to a violation of the common trend assumption and/or spillover effects between the control and treatment group in either the intersectoral and/or the intrasectoral approach. In fact, robustness checks in Section 6 indicate that spillover effects between workers with and without a binding MW are the main driving forces of these deviations as all other underlying assumptions seem to hold quite well. In a next step, we therefore explicitly estimate the employment effects along the wage distribution by running the intersectoral comparison for workers falling in different wage deciles. This is feasible because we are able to identify comparable workers within the control sector.
Employment effects along the wage distribution
In the following approach, the treatment group corresponds to all workers of the roofing sector who are covered by the MW regulations, whereas workers in the plumbing sector, who would have been covered if they worked in the roofing sector, are considered as the control group. In particular, we identify those plumbers for whom the MW would have been binding if they worked in the roofing sector given their individual and firm characteristics. We do so by imputing the wage plumbers would receive in the roofing sector given their characteristics, thus applying the wage imputation described in Section 3 not only to roofers but also to plumbers and estimating the probability of being bound by the MW (P MW ) analogous to roofers. Appendix E indicates that the distribution of P MW is similar across sectors, thus indicating the similarity of both sectors with respect to observable characteristics. Since the imputation of the counterfactual P MW among plumbers is similar to matching individuals with a comparable treatment intensity, the necessary common support along the whole distribution seems to be given. 26 . When including individuals with a minor employment in the LAK estimates, the treatment effect amounts to highly significant À17.3 percentage points. For a better comparability with the BA data, we leave these individuals out. Still, the estimates with minor employment indicate that the MW may have had a strong effect on their employment chances, a finding that should be approached in future research. 27. This is the case because the comparison within the roofing sector assumes a zero effect of the MW for workers without a binding MW.
We then estimate the ATT for each decile d it ¼ 1; . . .; 10 of the wage distribution using the following DiD framework: 28
where j d captures the time constant difference between workers of a different wage decile and a gÂd captures the time constant deviation between roofers and plumbers of the same decile. Furthermore, c pÂd allows for particular changes in each decile in the period after compared to the period before the MW introduction that are common to both groups, m t captures year-specific effects, while the same set of covariates X as before controls for observable differences across workers. The treatment indicator D it equals one for covered roofers in the period after the MW introduction (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) and zero for plumbers as well as roofers in the exante period . The indicator D it is interacted with d it so that we get an ATT for all wage deciles. Note that since the pool of workers in a particular wage decile may vary across time, we again use a fixed-effects linear probability model for the estimation, that is, we exploit the change in a wage decile across time on the individual level for identification by including c i in equation (3). The identifying assumption is that plumbers and roofers with the same set of covariates X and the same changes in the wage deciles would experience comparable changes in employment outcomes across time in the absence of the MW. In fact, this assumption is less strict than the assumption in Section 5.1 because we condition on the wage decile in addition to X. Moreover, we interact the model with the three subperiods (1997-2001; 2002-04; 2005-07) , since the effects may also differ by bite. Figure 4 displays the corresponding ATEs on the probability of continued employment in the roofing sector in percentage points as long as the effect is significant at least at the 5% significance level. The results indicate that the prospects of continued employment in eastern Germany have deteriorated due to the MW along the entire wage distribution in eastern Germany. Moreover, note that the impact on workers with wages in the upper wage deciles are partially significant only for the latest period where the bite of the MW was strongest. For western Germany, wage deciles that are not affected by a binding MW appear to be less affected by the MW. For workers whose wages fall in the 7th to 9th decile, no significant effects can be found at all. Still, there is some evidence for employment spillovers in line with the previous results because workers in the 3rd to 6th decile, for whom we find a decline in the chances of continued employment, are only marginally affected by a binding MW (see Appendix F). Also, the effect seems to follow the extended bite of the MW since wage deciles 5 and 6 are only affected in the later periods with a higher MW level. The negative effect on continued employment of roofers in the 10th decile might be caused by voluntary quits of predominantly master craftsmen who leave the sample by deciding to become self-employed and to establish a single-person company whose share of all companies markedly increased during the observation period.
This additional analysis confirms that there are relevant spillovers in eastern Germany whose temporal pattern confirms a link to the extending MW bite. For 28. The approach is related to the study of Neumark et al. (2004) , who also study the MW effects throughout the wage distribution. Compared to our study, the authors exploit the regional and time variation of the MW level in the UK and look at next years' employment status along the wage distribution, defined as the distribution of initial earnings relative to the old MW.
western Germany, employment spillovers are less strong but seem to exist for workers earning wages just above the MW and for workers in the highest wage decile. These negative employment outcomes for workers with wages above the MW allow for two not necessarily competing explanations. On the one hand, the observed pattern may suggest that workers are substituted by capital and that the substitutability differs for different types of workers with the least skilled workers being easiest to substitute. On the other hand, the result pattern is compatible with negative scale effects that mostly, if not for all workers, dominate a positive substitution effect between different types of workers. Of course, both explanations may be relevant to some extent, albeit qualitative interviews with leading experts in the roofing sector (see Aretz et al., 2011) suggest that the first may be the dominant explanation. In particular, the insiders doubt that the MW in the roofing sector had much of a scale effect while the relevance of technological advances such as the introduction of new roofing systems that reduce the necessary labour input have been stressed. 29 29. The results are partly in line with Neumark et al. (2004) , who find that workers whose wages are initially close to the MW (up to 1.3 times the MW) are most likely to be affected by changes in the wage floor. However, the authors find no evidence for spillovers in the upper part of the wage distribution, as opposed to our study.
ROBUSTNESS
Interpreting the intersectoral comparisons in Section 5.2 as evidence for employment effects for workers who earn a wage above the MW threshold rests on several assumptions. First, there should be no indirect effect of the MW regulations in the roofing sector on the plumbing sector. If the plumbing sector provides some substitutes for roofing services, for example, a negative employment effect in the roofing sector would boost employment in the plumbing sector, thereby overestimating a negative impact of the MW. However, the lack of any evident improvement in the revenues realised by the plumbing sector relative to the roofing sector after the MW introduction puts doubt on such spillovers (see Figure 1) . Furthermore, we find that transitions between both sectors are negligible and independent from the MW introduction. Both before and after 1997, only about 0.2% (0.1%) of all roofers (plumbers) enter the plumbing sector (roofing sector) in the next year. Second, the assumption of common trends across sectors before and after the MW introduction must hold. In order to examine the pre-treatment trend in employment outcomes, we rely on the three years prior to the MW introduction . For eastern Germany, Appendix D suggests a dip in employment chances in the roofing sector in 1996 that deviates from the trend in the plumbing sector. Indeed, placebo tests in rows (1) and (2) in Table 5 confirm the common trend assumption between 1994 and 1995, while there are significant deviations between 1995 and 1996. The decline in employment outcomes in 1996 may hint at anticipation effects since employment outcomes for the last pre-MW year are measured just three months prior to the MW introduction in October 1997. Excluding observations for 1996, however, suggests even somewhat stronger negative effects than in column (2) of Table 4 , cp. row (3) in Table  5 . If the dip in 1996 does not result from an anticipation effect, we should, however, not exclude this year, but adjust our estimates for diverging trends. A corresponding extension of the previous estimation that allows for diverging trends across sectors supports the previous findings (row (4) in Table 5 ). For western Germany, Appendix D suggests that there was a dip in employment outcomes for roofers relative to plumbers in 1995. Thus, compared to plumbers, the placebo tests in Table 5 suggest a less favourable trend for roofers between 1994 and 1995 but a positive trend from 1995 to 1996. Estimations that allow for diverging trends across sectors, however, confirm the previous findings.
Adjusting for diverging trends based on the few pre-MW years, however, may not suffice if the common trends assumption fails in the long run. As a robustness check, we ran estimations that were extended by interacting the treatment indicator D it to allow for a heterogeneous ATT for periods with distinct levels of a MW bite (1997-01, 2002-04 and 2005-07) in order to examine the timing of the effect after the MW introduction. As shown in row (5) in Table 5 , the impact of the MW in eastern Germany was significantly negative in all three sub-periods, which was already suggested by Figure 4 . In both parts of the country, the strongest impact occurred in the second period after the MW was raised to the level in western Germany. This suggests that firms were able to bear the additional costs that were imposed by the MW during the last period, which was Employment Effects in the Roofing Sector characterized by an economic revival of the German roofing sector. All in all, the common trend assumption for the intersectoral comparison seems to hold as the estimation results appear to be robust and also show a plausible impact pattern across time.
However, in order to validly identify employment spillover effects within the roofing sector, it is, thirdly, important that the common trend assumption holds for the intrasectoral comparison as well. 30 To the extent that all roofers are affected by the same demand conditions, it is plausible to assume that changes in employment outcomes for workers without a binding MW between the exante (1995-96) and the expost situation (1997-07) may be captured by the counterfactual change in employment outcomes for the treated roofers in the absence of the MW. However, for a period of 13 years that we cover in the estimations, diverging trends between workers with and without a binding MW in the absence of the MW may arise, for example, due to skill-biased technological advances. We therefore capture the potentially diverging trends by using comparable workers from the plumbing sector as an additional benchmark. In particular, we use plumbers with and without a counterfactually binding MW to run a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DiDiD) estimation, where the treatment Table 4 in all specifications; standard errors are clustered at the individual level in all specifications; significance levels: Ã 5%, ÃÃ 1%, ÃÃÃ 0.1%.
30. Since there are only two years available prior to the MW introduction, placebo tests for the time of its introduction and trend adjusted estimations appear rather useless in order to examine the common trends assumption in the long run.
indicator D it equals one for workers of the roofing sector with a binding MW after the MW introduction and zero for all other groups and time periods. If roofers with and without a binding MW had experienced different trends in their employment chances even in the absence of the MW, we can assume that plumbers with and without a counterfactually binding MW capture these trends. The corresponding DiDiD results in row (6) in Table 5 indicate that the employment effect in eastern Germany continues to be negative, but somewhat smaller than in the intrasectoral comparison in Table 4 . This may suggest that part of this negative effect is in fact due to a negative trend for workers with a binding MW relative to workers without a binding MW. Since representatives of the roofing sector repeatedly mentioned the need for catching up with technological progress in eastern Germany (see Aretz et al., 2011 ), this appears a plausible finding. For western Germany, the difference between the DiD and DiDiD estimates are smaller and suggest that trends in western Germany rather diverge in the opposite direction. More importantly, we find that the implied ATE for an average covered worker is smaller than suggested by the intersectoral comparison in the previous section. All in all, the robustness checks confirm that employment spillovers within the roofing sector -as reported in Section 5.2 -are likely to be the main explanation for the deviating results of the inter-and intrasectoral comparison.
CONCLUSION
This study analysed the impact of minimum wages in the German roofing sector on workers' chances of continued employment. For the identification of average employment outcomes, we contrasted the estimated MW impact when comparing the chances of continued employment in the roofing sector with a control sector and when comparing the chances of roofers with and without a binding MW. In addition, we estimate the causal impact of the MW for workers with and without a binding MW as well as along the entire wage distribution. We are, thus, able to also identify indirect effects of the MW on workers in the upper parts of the wage distribution for whom the MW is not binding. Our main conclusions are:
• On average, the MW in the roofing sector resulted in poorer chances of remaining employed according to both the intersectoral comparison as well as the comparison of workers with and without a binding MW within the roofing sector. This is especially true for eastern Germany, where the MW level gave rise to a much higher share of (directly) affected workers of about 50% compared to 5% in western Germany. Given the limited compliance with the MW regulations, the impact could even be stronger if compliance was fully enforced. Compared to the results in the construction sector by, for example, K€ onig and M€ oller (2009) and Frings (2012), we therefore find stronger evidence for negative employment effects especially in eastern Germany possibly resulting from a stronger bite of the MW.
• Estimates from the comparison of workers with and without a binding MW seem to be underestimated compared to estimates from an intersectoral com-Employment Effects in the Roofing Sector parison. If one is willing to assume that the common trend assumption holds and that the control sector is not affected by spillover effects, assumptions that are supported by some robustness checks, this deviation indicates that the MW also affects the employment chances of roofers who are not directly affected by a binding MW.
• Running an intersectoral comparison of employment chances along the entire wage distribution by exploiting the counterfactual position of workers of the control sector in the wage distribution of the roofing sector confirms this previous suspicion. The prospects of continued employment deteriorated due to the MW along the entire wage distribution in eastern Germany. In western Germany, spillovers are less strong but also exist for workers just above the MW level.
• The decline in employment chances among workers without a binding MW may indicate that scale effects dominate substitution effects and/or that minimum wages induce some capital-labour substitution. While both may be relevant to some extent, the latter may be the dominant force according to interviews that we conducted with sector insiders. In particular, they consider new roofing systems as a potential means of reducing minimum-wage induced labour costs but question a strong decline in output since the demand for roofing services appears to be rather price-inelastic.
These findings on the impact of the MW regulations on the chances of continued employment should not, however, be equated with the overall MW impact on the sector's employment. In particular, the single-person companies, whose share among all companies tripled during the observation period to 23% in 2010, are not accounted for by our analysis. Furthermore, given the specific conditions of the roofing sector, for example, the rather high level of qualification and the low labour intensity, a transferability of the results to other sectors which might be subject to MW regulations in the future has to be viewed with caution.
Despite these reservations, the presented evidence clearly highlights the need for a broader perspective on employment effects of minimum wages by also taking a closer look at workers who do not appear to be affected by the MW at a first glance. Moreover, our results put doubt on any attempts to identify employment effects of minimum wages by comparing workers with and without a binding MW within a covered sector. responsible for all results and conclusions derived in this study. (Year 1997=100) 1994 (Year 1997=100) 1995 (Year 1997=100) 1996 (Year 1997=100) 1997 (Year 1997=100) 1998 (Year 1997=100) 1999 (Year 1997=100) 2000 (Year 1997=100) 2001 (Year 1997=100) 2002 (Year 1997=100) 2003 (Year 1997=100) 2004 (Year 1997=100) 2005 (Year 1997=100) 2006 (Year 1997=100) 2007 (Year 1997=100) 2008 Year
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